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I borrow the inspiration for the title from a seminal piece on American
Puritanism, From the Covenant to the Revival, by Perry Miller.3 °' In his
essay, Miller outlines America's nineteenth century cultural struggle to
apply a covenant theology, a covenant that posited a special relationship
among the individual, community, and God, to a society facing the
fragmenting forces of liberal, social, and economic theory. What the
covenant appealed to was a sense of the closeness of the community, a
closeness that involved certain responsibilities and, failing those
responsibilities, invited "covenant afflictions:" a corporate punishment for
communal transgressions.
With the turn of a new century approaching, the struggle we face is not
wholly dissimilar from the struggle Miller identified. And from this
perspective, it is perhaps not accidental that President Clinton, in seeking
the presidency, sought to articulate a "New Covenant," one that, like the
covenant of the nineteenth century, was both a response to and an
accommodation of an increasingly fragmented religious, social, and
political environment. The "New Covenant" for Clinton was not simply a
passing phrase. When it was invoked at Notre Dame, a Clinton campaign
advisor suggested that it was a "defining speech. 30 2 It was a consistent
theme of numerous campaign speeches, including his election night
acceptance speech, and it was reinvoked midway through Clinton s first
term in a 1995 Georgetown address.
My concern here is not with explaining why the "New Covenant"
failed to capture the political imagination of the electorate; rather, my
interest lies in how the covenant as a political symbol was analyzed by
both the media and scholarship. My suggestion is that this treatment is
itself symbolic of a far deeper dilemma that faces not only President
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Clinton but also future presidents. The problem is this: at the same time
that the public turns increasingly to the President to provide a "vision" of a
common purpose and direction to government and society, the articulation
of that vision rests on a rhetoric that in both media and scholarly accounts
has been devalued. By this I mean that rhetoric is no longer viewed as
conveying a sense of values, experiences, and purpose. This devaluing has
occurred because rhetoric has come to be analyzed as a technical
instrument of political persuasion. And though there are certainly
technical aspects of rhetoric, our contemporary focus on rhetorical
technique excludes from our analysis, and may even undercut, the critical
role of rhetoric in providing a meaningful vocabulary that is essential to a
continuing democratic discourse.
I take as my point of departure two recent works on the presidency.
The first is Jeffrey Tulis's thesis that this century has seen the emergence
of the "rhetorical presidency," at the heart of which is a growing
expectation that the President will provide "popular leadership" through
direct rhetorical appeals to the public. "Today it is taken for granted,"
writes Tulis, "that [p]residents have a duty constantly to defend
themselves publicly, to promote policy initiatives nationwide, and to
inspirit the population. ''303 Among these public duties, presidents (and
presidential candidates) are increasingly expected to provide a "vision," an
expectation that is born out by even a cursory glance at the media during
election time. Writes David Broder, as if on cue from Tulis, there is no
role more important for a president than to "mobilize and focus public
opinion" by "being communicator-in-chief.
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My second point of departure is a recent examination by Richard Ellis
and Aaron Wildavsky of presidential challenges through the theoretical
lens of cultural theory.30 5 Their work can be understood as part of what
Tulis describes as an "interpretive" turn in presidential studies, from a
search for causes of presidential behavior to an increased interest in the
President and presidential rhetoric as a reflection of and on American
cultural self-understanding. 30 6  Ellis and Wildavsky argue that
"[p]residential leadership is, in large part, the art of building or sustaining
cultural coalitions." 30 7 Leadership, thus, rests on understanding and
responding to different cultural claims, claims that are premised upon
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different systems of beliefs and social interactions. There are a variety of
ways for a president to do this, from Washington's public appearance of
power to mask a lack of substantive authority,308 to Jefferson
"dissembling" his publicly stated purposes from his private actions, 309 to
Lincoln's subordination of hierarchical claims to individualism made
possible through the crisis of the Civil War, 310 to Eisenhower's "hidden-
hand style," which allowed him to maintain a public image uncorrupted by
political intrigue.
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If we bring together the observations of Tulis and of Ellis and
Wildavsky, we are confronted with a problem. Following the argument of
Tulis, the growing public nature of the presidency makes private deals
unseemly, and the rhetorical demands on the President make coyness
unlikely. Presidents of the future will have to respond to cultural
dilemmas that arise, at least in part, rhetorically through the articulation of
a "vision." But underlying this demand for a vision is a fundamental
ambiguity: the "vision," as suggested by Tulis, must be popular; but if it is
to answer to cultural dilemmas, it must also be meaningful. This is not
impossible. But the task is made more difficult by the emergence over the
last several decades of an understanding and evaluation of rhetoric
primarily as a technique of political manipulation. This understanding
works ultimately to undercut any claim to meaning, even as we clamor for
it.
II
The treatment of rhetoric as a technique has been promoted in both
scholarly and media- based accounts of the presidency. Research on the
presidency has focused overwhelmingly on rhetoric as a political tool of
persuasion, 312 as strategic adaptations in public to reach one's undisclosed
goals, 313 as acts of public relations 314 or "spin control," or as a means of
self- promotion.315 Recent scholarship on Clinton's rhetoric has similarly
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focused on technique. One article, for example, examined "the utility of
identification" in Clinton's stump speeches "as a persuasive technique."
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Another analysis of Clinton's rhetorical style concluded that "this critical
assessment largely ignores Clinton's content or substance," which the
author argued can be more appropriately judged by "the polls, the press,
and ultimately the populace."1
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In media accounts as well, rhetoric appears, for better or for worse, as
a matter of technique. After any given speech, media attention is focused
overwhelmingly on whether the rhetorical tool was wielded effectively:
did the President look relaxed? Did his voice waver or his eyes blink too
much? Was the speech too long? How sustained was the applause? What
was the reaction of the populace to the speech? And, perhaps most
tellingly, what was the immediate response of an assembled group of
voters, as recorded via their "perception analyzer," to each moment of the
speech?318 After one news conference, a front page article in The New
York Times praised Clinton with this subheading: "Clinton Offers
Change, Syntactically Speaking." 319 The article sought to contrast the
speaking style of Bush with "the man from Little Rock" who "left not the
slightest doubt that the White House will get its syntax tightened when he
moves in on Jan. 20. ' 32o Apart from talk of speech patterns, though, there
is the suggestion (and we see this in scholarship on rhetoric as well) that
assessments of rhetorical technique are revealing of something more
substantive. We see this in an article written some months later that
assailed Clinton for his "fractured thoughts," as evidenced, not
surprisingly, by the syntax of an ad lib in Cleveland.32'
Even when the media assesses patterns of rhetoric over time, these
assessments are still premised on a notion of rhetoric as a technique. This
is why, perhaps, it was so puzzling to one commentator that Clinton could
have a "communications problem" since he and his advisors had already
"proved their mastery of modern communication techniques during the
1992 campaign. ''322 To explain the "communications problem,"
316 John T. Llewellyn, Bill Clinton's Stump Speaking: Persuasion Through Identification,
in BILL CLINTON ON STUMP, STATE, AND STAGE: THE RHETORICAL ROAD TO THE WHITE
HOUSE 52, 53 (Stephen A. Smith ed., 1994).
317 Ronald H. Carpenter, The Stylistic Persona of Bill Clinton: From Arkansas and
Aristotelian Attica, in BILL CLINTON ON STUMP, STATE, AND STAGE: THE RHETORICAL
ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 101, 128 (Stephen A. Smith ed., 1994).
318 Fred A. Barnes, The Persona Plays in Peoria... But Will Empathy Be Enough?, 25
NAT'L J. 474-75 (1993).
319 R.W. Apple, Jr., In Command of Language: Clinton Offers Change, Syntactically
Speaking, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at Al.
320 Id.
321 Lloyd Grove, Clinton's Sudden Visit to Babble-On: What Happened to The Great
Articulator?, WASH. POST, May 12, 1993, at B1, B9.
322 James A. Barnes, Bridging Clinton's Communications Gap, 31 NAT'L J. 1816, 1816
(1994).
commentators have once again found recourse in the failure of technique,
whether it is a question of media management, in which Clinton's message
gets lost among competing messages from his campaign and
administration, 323 or whether it is a failure of style, in which Clinton "uses
too many long words and complicated sentences that don't crescendo."
324
When things are not going well, the "mastery" that was heralded now
appears as incompetence, and "vision" appears as a last resort to "sell"
something.325 Regardless, in each case rhetoric is understood as a tool of
manipulation.
Certainly, there is an element of "manipulation" in rhetoric. We all
know from Aristotle that rhetoric is the art of persuasion. And we observe
the formation of entire institutions around the notion of rhetoric as a
technique in presidential politics: public relations firms, presidential
media consultants, polling operations, and, tellingly, institutionalized
speech writing corps. Whether this is a cause or an effect, presidential
rhetoric has become inextricably tied, to recall Joe McGinniss' words,
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to the "selling" of the President, in which rhetoric is viewed as a "way of
making image rather than policy. "
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That presidents have used rhetoric to build popular support and craft
an image is neither new nor alarming. What has changed is our own
assessment of the implications of the role rhetoric plays in this process.
We can attribute this change in part to advancing media technology that
has made an industry of image. But we can also locate in the aftermath of
Vietnam and Watergate a psychological transformation, where rhetoric
could no longer be trusted but appeared, instead, as a veil behind which to
hide reality.
We need only go back to the previous century to see how different this
is from an America described as a "speech-making country" in which the
appeal of rhetoric was precisely its role in the construction of an
identity. 328 In an essay on George Bancroft's History of the United States,
for example, the North American Review, the most prominent Whig
journal in America, applauded Bancroft's work, even though he was a
Democrat, because it reflected more than the "accumulation of facts" in a
"timid adherence to what is erroneously called truth. 3 29 It involved the
recalling of the "actual presence" of the past, to make immortal the
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"enduring zeal, the open-handed liberality, the fortitude, and the heroism,
with which, in the day of small beginnings, the first foundations were
laid. 330 Such great Whig orators as Edward Everett "meant to create a
tradition that would inspire as well as inform. Like the Attic orators and
dramatists, Everett knew the power of symbols to create a people's
political identity.331
This notion of rhetoric is not simply the idiosyncratic expression of a
particular historical period. Rather, at a more theoretical level, rhetoric is
integral to the process of symbolic construction. Creating references, and
the interweaving of these references, is "itself a social process, an
occurrence not in the head but in that public world where 'people talk
together, name things, make assertions, and to a degree understand each
other."' 332 Speeches are, indeed, meant to persuade, as they are grounded
in cultural concerns and orientations toward economic and political life.
To this extent, these utterances reflect an attempt to convey ideas and
concerns in a publicly accessible language that in part draws upon, and in
turn interprets and refashions, cultural referents shared and understood by
the audience.
In treating rhetoric solely as a technique, we deprive words and images
of precisely this richness and multivocality that draw on an accumulation
of meanings over time. We search neither for meaning nor resonance, but
rather we scrutinize each word in its relationship with every other word,
looking for the inconsistencies and vagaries that, in fact, inhere in
symbolic expression. I am reminded of the words Edmund Burke used in
describing attempts by revolutionaries in France to strip away tradition:
All the pleasing illusion, which made power gentle, and obedience liberal,
which harmonized the different shades of life, and which, by a bland
assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and
soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire
of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off.
All the super-added ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral
imagination, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as
necessary to cover the defects of our naked shivering nature, and to raise it
to dignity in our estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd, and
antiquated fashion.
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Words no longer clothed in shared meaning appear naked and shivering.
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And woe be unto that president who talks of meaning, for what once was
the clothing of tradition now appears as a guise, a costume worn to mask
our nakedness. When we strip rhetoric of meaning, there can be no stated
beliefs. The search for truth, instead, becomes a process of unmasking in
which the first charge is that of hypocrisy.
334
III
Before turning to how this cultural separation of rhetoric and meaning
manifests itself in accounts of the Clinton administration, I want to
suggest how we see this expressed in the Reagan and Bush
administrations. My argument is that the twin demand that "vision" be
both popular and meaningful comes into conflict at the point at which
rhetoric is viewed as a technique. Viewing rhetoric as a technique shifts
our focus away from the cultural meanings that inhere in rhetoric to
appraisals of style. But more dangerously, viewing rhetoric as a technique
fundamentally undercuts expressions of meaning by casting such
expressions as acts of political manipulation. This places the President in a
bind: rhetoric will be judged a failure if it does not mobilize public
opinion; yet, if the rhetoric succeeds in mobilizing public opinion, we will
explain this success by pointing to how it was "used." This use, in turn,
casts suspicion on the meaningfulness of the rhetoric by raising doubts
about its sincerity.
By all appearances, Reagan presents a challenge to this thesis since he
was heralded throughout his two terms as "The Great Communicator." Yet
this name is revealing of the separation of rhetoric and meaning in two
ways. First, the name itself was used to describe Reagan's technical
mastery of the "communication age;" namely, his ability to appear
spontaneous while reading a TelePrompTer, to script his schedule, to
surround himself with visually stimulating images, to focus on a single
theme for the day or week by controlling the flow of information to the
media, and, of course, to "act." Reagan, writes Neustadt, "may simply
have come from the right profession for the technological moment."335
So distinct was rhetoric from meaning in both popular and scholarly
accounts that Reagan could be called "The Great Communicator" even as
he was assailed for being out of touch, for seeking contradictory goals, for
not having his facts straight, and for his seeming ability to escape
responsibility or blame for charges against the Administration. There is an
irony here that leads to the second aspect of the separation of rhetoric and
meaning in the Reagan Administration. By focusing on the technique of
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"The Great Communicator," we lead ourselves to believe that Reagan's
popularity was largely a manufactured one, a rhetorical duping in Teflon
coating of the American public.
The perspective offered here suggests a different approach. We can
explain much of Reagan's rhetorical success because his words resonated
with the shared interests and concerns of a large portion of the American
populace, and that resonance provides considerable leeway in how
speeches will be judged. Reagan's technical mastery did not make these
symbols meaningful; rather, his mastery allowed him greater control so
that he was able largely to bypass or minimize a media filter that insisted
on this separation of rhetoric and meaning. By focusing on Reagan's
communication as a theatrical act, we lost an important opportunity to
engage in a sustained discussion, perhaps even a critique, of the values
and meanings conveyed in the rhetoric.
President Bush paid dearly for this media focus on rhetorical
technique, for what the media and populace came to demand of Bush was
what he could not deliver: a rhetorical vision. I have argued elsewhere that
his inability to do this was attributable to his "Oakeshottian" ways,336 but
what is important in this regard is that Bush's rhetorical failure was taken
as evidence of lack of purpose. Once told to provide a vision, any vision
articulated at that point could not help but sound contrived and politically
self-serving. By the end of the re-election campaign, Bush had become the
"visions" President who, like the cookware (but lacking the Teflon
coating), the American people were convinced they could see through.
The charge of rhetorical inconstancy that has been leveled against
Clinton is consistent with, and given force by, the separation of rhetoric
and meaning. I am not arguing that Clinton has advanced a consistent
agenda or message (though I believe there is more consistency than is
often assumed); rather, I argue that media and scholarly approaches to
Clinton's rhetoric begin by divesting the rhetoric of any meaning. This
assumption justifies both a critique when rhetoric proves unpopular and a
casting of suspicion when it is popular. The examples are not difficult to
find. One article, for example, in suggesting that Clinton's "own words
haven't mattered much," seemed to assess the rhetoric by its ability to
mobilize popular and congressional opinion. 337 As evidence, the author
pointed to Clinton's failure to "dislodge" the "labor-management impasse"
in baseball, to secure popular support for loan guarantees to Mexico, to
win public and congressional support for his health care plan, to gain
support for intervention in Haiti, and to secure Republican support for
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raising the minimum wage. 33 In a striking reversal of what we often count
as evidence of leadership, the author noted that on many of these issues,
including the loan guarantees to Mexico and a more active role in Haiti,
the President "went ahead anyway." 339 Leadership, as judged by this
criteria, rests not on conviction nor on the merits of particular action, but
on the ability to manufacture popular appeal for a particular proposal.34 °
Only three months later, this same author applied a different standard
for judging rhetoric. Now he considered the rhetoric sincere only if at no
point did the President flinch from political exigency or legitimate his
actions through popular appeal. After Clinton's address in the wake of the
terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City, the article opened with an appraisal
of the instrumentality of Clinton's comments by noting: "Personally as
well as politically, it suits President Clinton to act as a moral leader in a
time of national grief. 341 Yet the article concluded that "the notion of
Clinton as a moral leader still sounds a little like a punch line."342 The
reason for this, the author suggests, is because the President had backed
away from past "moral forays," specifically health care, teenage
pregnancy, and Says in the military, and because of his own "personal
shortcomings."
Clinton's rhetoric is viewed as merely a matter of technique, even
when seen as "compelling"344 or as "touching those he meets." 345 For if
rhetoric is only a matter of technique, then sincerity is simply an act of
"artfulness," a term employed by Paul Greenberg in giving Clinton the
nickname "Slick Willie." 346 Who could argue? Certainly not Morton
Kondracke who, in one early assessment of Clinton in The New Republic,
titled his piece "Slick Willy," even though the article was about whether
Clinton would be able to garner sufficient popular support and political
capital to challenge the liberal wing of the party. Certainly Burt
Solomon would not argue since, on the one hand, he would pronounce
Clinton's rhetoric a failure because it did not move people, yet, on the
other hand, he could attribute to Clinton a "cultural suppleness" when he
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actually was able to engage voters rhetorically and respond to their
concerns.
348
We can make all of this consistent, though no more satisfactory, by
positing that rhetoric will be judged by its ability to shape outcomes. This
seems to be the guiding assumption of discussions of presidential rhetoric.
Kondracke asks, "Does the record match the rhetoric? 3 49 Fred Greenstein
suggests that it really would not matter to "members of the Washington
community that a President seemed insincere" so long as "he were seen as
having the public behind him."350 Rhetoric that counts is rhetoric that
works.
We are back where we began. So let us ask, instead, about rhetoric that
does not speak directly to specific policy issues but addresses broader
issues of history and community purpose. Of this, appraisals are no
different. In one address, for example, Clinton talked about how "the
seeds of our new difficulties that we face in such stark reality today were
sown beginning three decades ago in changes in our social fabric and two
decades ago in changes in our general economic condition."351 When this
speech was critiqued, however, the author never took up any of the issues
actually raised. Instead, the article brought us back to appraising the
instrumentality of the speech, this time suggesting that Clinton really only
pays "lip service to history" because he "doesn t harbor any cherished
historical lessons or invoke historical myths to order his world. 352 This is
both bad and good: bad because Clinton says he uses history but really
does not; good because history really is not a "reliable guide," is
"crammed with contradictory lessons," has been used in making "some of
the worst decisions in history," and because "it's tempting for a President
to think too much about history. '" 3
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So what of one historical myth that the President did in fact invoke:
that of the "New Covenant?" The notion of a covenant forms a rich part of
the American past, figuring most prominently in Puritan theology and
rhetoric to explain the responsibilities of a chosen people to God and to
each other. There are several aspects of this covenant as articulated in
America's past that are noteworthy. First, the covenant is initiated by God,
and must be initiated by God, because of the human fallen condition.
Second, the covenant is a commitment by God to save those who believe
rather than those who can perform uncorrupted works. Third, though
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salvation comes to the individual, the covenant occurs among an already
constituted people.
What is so important about the covenant in this regard, and is lost in
contemporary commentary on this notion, is that the covenant arises out
of, and in turn confirms, a sense of community responsibility that
presupposes some authority that stands outside the community itself.
While contractual obligations arise out of the arbitrary agreement between
two or more parties, the covenant, instead, provides a way for the
fulfillment of already felt responsibilities. This is why John Winthrop, in
his lay sermon pronounced before landing on American soil, spoke of the
promise of the "City upon a Hill" as resting upon "charity" toward
others. 354 If the people failed in this task, the community, and not just the
individual, would perish. This is why in subsequent generations, and we
can see this happening through Lincoln, there were continual calls to
renew this covenant as a way for the community to remember its
responsibilities.
President Clinton's words, press and scholarly commentary to the
contrary, suggest that he understood this. Though much of the "New
Covenant" as expressed by Clinton had been secularized to accommodate
itself to broader economic and social concerns, there were three prominent
aspects of the covenant that arose from this tradition. First, the "New
Covenant" rested upon a sense of promise for the future: a "city upon a
hill" for Winthrop and the fulfillment of the "American dream" for
Clinton.355 Second, the "New Covenant," like the covenants of old, arose
as a response, in part, to a sense that this promise was itself endangered by
a fragmented community that had "wandered" from "the lessons of our
faiths and our history," traditions that had served as "the ties that bind
US. ' 356 As Clinton suggested in another speech, "our government stands
discredited, our people disillusioned. There's a hole in our politics where a
sense of common purpose used to be."357 Finally, the "New Covenant"
served, like previous covenants, as a "renewal. 3 58 What Clinton meant by
this is that a "New Covenant" does not create something new but serves as
a reaffirmation of already existing responsibilities that we have toward
each other. We are already bound together by our traditions and the
promise of our future is similarly "bound up with the destiny of every
American." 359
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With few exceptions, the "New Covenant" was read not for its
meaning but was appraised for its political expedience. Fred Barnes, for
example, in an article devoted to a discussion of the "New Covenant,"
subtitled the argument, "Clinton's religious strategy." 360 We need to read
only three paragraphs into the article before we discover that "Clinton and
his handlers have understood" from the beginning that religion is "a plus
with most voters."361 Clinton and Gore, therefore, "have taken the next
step, affirming the value of religion and touting their own faith. 3 62 Burt
Solomon, who in an article on the need for Bush to demonstrate "a vision
for guiding the nation's future," describes the "New Covenant" as the
vision "hawked by his Democratic opponent, Bill Clinton."363 Thus, we
demand vision while simultaneously devaluing the rhetoric used to craft
this vision. Two years later, Solomon would comment on Clinton's
suggestion that one "can't have a value-free society," interpreting this, in
the next sentence, as "merely the latest in a succession of episodes of
public religiousness." 364 The language here is important, because we have
the denigration of the message through the qualifier "merely," a casting of
suspicion on the sincerity of the religious convictions by referring to their
"publicness," and a description of these statements as "episodic," as words
stripped of any connection to or continuity with a system of beliefs or
values but merely understood as discrete acts of political expedience. As
evidence, the article points to Billy Graham's deliverance of the invocation
and benediction at Clinton's inauguration, Clinton's propensity to quote
from the Bible, Clinton's reading of Stephen Carter's The Culture of
Disbelief, and Hillary Clinton's statements about "the politics of
meaning.''365 So that we don't miss the point, the article suggests that
"Clinton returned to his religious roots only when it was politically
useful," joining the more conservative church "that put him in the center
of the choir on the state's top-rated television show at noontime on
Sundays." 36
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My suggestion is not that the "New Covenant" failed as a political
expression because of this focus on technique; for it is certainly possible,
as we saw during the Reagan years, that symbols can find resonance. My
point is that media and scholarly appraisals of the "New Covenant" found
it difficult to even approach the rhetoric of the covenant, just as they were
unable to approach Reagan's rhetoric, as an articulation of meaning. There
is a significant implication to this devaluation of rhetoric, for it makes it
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difficult to carry on a political dialogue about any collective purpose. E.J.
Dionne, Jr.,367 in response to Clinton's speech in Memphis, lamented that
there has been an "absence of more public talk and thinking along the
lines the President laid down on Saturday." 368 But such a dialogue
becomes unnecessary, and is even inhibited, if we view rhetoric only as
technique. For then we encourage a politics not of deliberation but of
either cynicism, in which we distrust the rhetoric, or "felt need, 3 69 in
which policy and discourse are driven by the vicissitudes of opinion.
Clinton invoked the "New Covenant" most recently in response to the
Republican "Contract With America." The contrast could not have been
greater. Where the notion of a "Covenant" rests on a responsibility and
interdependence that emerges from our history, contracts create
obligations that arise out of the wills of the respective parties. In many
ways, the "Contract" is the perfect symbol that conjoins the rhetorical
demand for both popularity and meaning, for there is no meaning in a
contract other than what arises out of the popular, and momentary,
agreement of the parties. This seems to have been recognized by its
drafters, who crafted both the terms and the words of the "Contract"
through careful use of polling research. But the "Contract" points, as well,
to the danger of political rhetoric that rests its authority entirely on
popular agreement, for there is no referent outside the agreement for what
is right or just or fair. Certainly, democracies rest upon popular support.
But political discourse, if it is to endure, must be able to answer more than
"how" to create this support; it must also be able to ask "why." This final
question cannot be answered when rhetoric has no meaning.
367 E.J. Dionne, Jr., Clinton's Bully Pulpit, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1993, at A21.
368 Orlando Patterson, Our History vs. Clinton's Covenant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at
A29.
369 Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 22 (Expanded ed. 1962). Other references include President Bill Clinton, Speech
at Cleveland City Club, Cleveland, Ohio (May 21, 1992); President Bill Clinton, Speech
at Georgetown University (July 6, 1995); Alexander Cockbum, Anything for Political
Advantage, in NEW STATESMAN & SOCIETY 22-24 (1994).
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